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Introduction 
 
Dairy farmers pay a mandatory assessment of 15 cents per hundred pounds of milk marketed in 
the continental United States to fund a national demand expansion program.  This assessment 
generally ranges between 0.75 and 1% of the price farmers receive for their milk, and most of the 
money is devoted to generic advertising of fluid milk (e.g., Got Milk?) and cheese (e.g., Behold 
the Power of Cheese) products.  The aims of this program are to increase consumer demand for 
fluid milk and dairy products, enhance dairy farm revenue, and reduce the amount of surplus 
milk purchased by the government under the Dairy Price Support Program.  Legislative authority 
for these assessments is contained in the Dairy Production Stabilization Act of 1983.  To 
increase fluid milk and dairy product consumption, the National Dairy Promotion and Research 
Board was established to invest in generic dairy advertising and promotion, nutrition research, 
education, and new product development.  More recently, fluid milk processors began their own 
generic fluid milk advertising program (the Milk Mustache print media campaign), which is 
funded by a mandatory $0.20 per hundredweight processor “checkoff” on fluid milk sales.  
These two programs represent the two largest generic promotion programs in the United States, 
raising $370 million per year. 
 Generic advertising differs from traditional branded advertising in several important 
ways.  First, while branded advertising is an individual firm’s activity, generic advertising is a 
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collective effort by all firms within an industry.  Second, branded advertising attempts to 
differentiate a firm’s product from its competitors; generic advertising is not geared at product 
differentiation and is most successful for products that are homogeneous in characteristics such 
as basic commodities. Third, the goal of generic advertising is to increase overall demand for a 
commodity, while branded advertising is primarily market share driven.  If generic advertising is 
effective in increasing demand and price, the long run effectiveness of the program will depend 
critically on the nature of the supply response to the price increase.  Consequently, in evaluating 
the impact of generic dairy advertising, modelers must explicitly link supply response to demand 
and price increases due advertising. 
 There has been a lot of research on the economic impacts of generic dairy advertising 
since it is the largest generic advertising program (see Ferraro et al. (1996) for a thorough 
annotated bibliography). This research falls into two broad categories.  The first category of 
research has been positive in nature, and has evaluated what are the economic impacts of generic 
advertising on dairy markets. The majority of this research indicates that generic advertising has 
increased overall market demand and prices at all market levels, and the benefits of generic 
advertising substantially outweighs the cost.  For instance, Kaiser (2006) found a benefit-cost 
ratio of 4.32 for fluid milk and cheese advertising by dairy farmers.  The second line of research 
has been more normative in nature, investigating optimal allocation issues.  Studies include 
optimal spatial allocation of advertising by markets (Liu and Forker, 1990), allocation of 
advertising over time (Vande Kamp and Kaiser, 2000), allocation of advertising across products 
(Kaiser and Forker , 1993), allocation of advertising by media type (Pritchett, Liu, and Kaiser,  
1998) and allocation of expenditures by marketing and research activity (Chung and Kaiser, 
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1999).  All these studies have either used econometric methods, optimization, or a combination 
of both.  There have been no studies done that have used System Dynamics (SD). 
 There are two characteristics of U.S. dairy markets which present difficulties to 
researchers interested in modeling the impacts of generic dairy advertising.  First, the U.S. dairy 
industry is one of the most heavily regulated markets in terms of economic regulations.  Milk 
pricing at the farm and processor levels is significantly impacted by federal and state milk 
marketing orders, the Dairy Price Support Program, and import tariffs.  Properly incorporating 
the impacts of these regulations on prices is essential for sound evaluation of generic advertising.  
Second, milk is a raw commodity that has many components that have differing end uses.  This 
makes modeling all the possible uses for these components and the associated elaborate pricing 
structure of the market a complicated process.  Unfortunately, the majority of previous studies 
have dealt with these issues through simplifying assumptions and aggregation of products, and 
have therefore omitted potentially important linkages that could effect the accuracy of the 
models.  These two characteristics of the dairy market make the use of SD very appealing. 
 Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to examine the impacts of generic advertising 
expenditures for fluid milk and cheese in a multiple-product dynamic simulation model, and 
examine selected expenditure strategies to increase revenues received by dairy farmers.  A 
broader objective is to contribute to our understanding of how generic advertising influences 
product markets. 
Model Description 
A conceptual feedback model (Figure 1) illustrates a number of the differences between the 
impacts of generic and branded advertising.  First, one important overall objective of generic 
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Figure 1.  Conceptual Feedback Model of Generic Advertising Effects 
advertising is to increase revenues for input suppliers (dairy farmers in this case).  Generic 
advertising expenditures increase sales of the advertised products, which increases the  
demand for the raw input (milk) needed as an input to manufacture those products and increases 
their price.  Increased raw input use for the manufacture of advertised products (fluid milk, 
cheese) decreases the availability of the raw input to manufacture non-advertised products 
(butter, dried milk).  This reduces the available supply of non-advertised products, increasing 
their price.  Minimum raw input price regulation exists in the US dairy industry; the minimum 
price is calculated as a function of product prices and product for which the raw input is used.  
An increase in the price of non-advertised products increases the minimum regulated price, 
which increases input costs for manufacturers of both advertised and non-advertised products.  
The price increase for advertised products also contributes to increases in the minimum regulated 
price.  This increases the revenues earned by raw input suppliers (the objective), but also 
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increases input costs.  The input cost increase increases the prices of all products, which will 
have a dampening effect on demand. 
In addition to the typical (balancing1) feedback effects between price, supply and demand 
that operate in most markets there are two other feedback loops that influence that outcomes of 
generic advertising that merit mention.  The first is the regulated price loop, which implies that 
the effects of generic advertising will be offset to a certain extent through increases in input costs 
for all dairy product manufacturers through increases in the minimum regulated price.  The 
second balancing loop indicates that increases in the price for the raw input supplier will increase 
the quantity supplied of the raw product.  This increases the availability of the raw input for use 
in the manufacture of non-advertised products, decreasing their price compared to what they 
would have been.  An important issue in the evaluation of generic advertising expenditures is the 
extent to which minimum price regulation and raw input supply response feedback loops erode 
the effectiveness of advertising expenditures over time.   
To evaluate the effectiveness of generic advertising in the dairy industry context, we 
developed a more detailed empirical model.  This model builds upon the conceptual commodity 
model described in Sterman (2000) and the dairy industry price determination model developed 
by Nicholson and Fiddaman (2003).  To capture the effects of minimum price regulation, the 
model includes a total of 17 final and intermediate2 dairy products.  Perishable products such as 
fluid milk, yogurt and ice cream are treated as flow variables for which production is equal to 
                                                
1 The term “balancing loop” (indicated in Figure 1 with a B) implies that an initial change in one of the variables in 
the loop will ultimately result in pressure for that variable to move in the direction opposite the change, all other 
things being equal.  .In contrast, a “reinforcing loop” (indicated in Figure 1 with an R) indicates than an initial 
change will be reinforced through the feedback process. More formally, loop polarity is defined as 
)( 11
IuputOutput
XXSGN !!  where SGN is the sign function and XOutput is the value of a variable X after one 
feedback cycle in response to an initial change in the value of XInput (Sterman, 2000). 
2 In dairy modeling, “intermediate” products are those dairy products that are used in the manufacture of other 
products.  A common example is the use of dried milk in cheese manufacturing.  Final products are those used by 
non-dairy manufacturers (e.g, other food processors) or final consumers. 
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sales.  Commercial inventories of storable commodities such as butter, cheese, dried milk and 
dried whey (used in the minimum pricing formulae) are represented as stock variables, where 
production increases inventories and sales reduces them.  Increases in commercial inventories of 
these products result in decreases in the prices of these products.  In the dairy industry, raw milk 
can be separated into a variety of components (butterfat, proteins, lactose and minerals) using 
various physical processes (e.g., filtration).  Because of this, it is important to adequately 
represent the physical balance of these components across different product uses.  This is 
represented in our model through the use of skim milk and cream components.  (Essentially, 
cream represents fat and skim milk represents protein, lactose and minerals.)   
In addition to the minimum regulated pricing that operates in the dairy industry, other key 
policy interventions include price supports for selected manufactured products (butter, cheese 
and dried milk) and restrictions on dairy product trade.  Price supports operate through the 
willingness of the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC; established by the federal government) 
to purchase dairy products at prices designed to maintain a minimum level of milk prices paid to 
dairy farmers3, or through direct payments made to farmers when milk prices fall below a target 
level.  Dairy trade policies restrict the quantities of many imported (storable) products, which 
maintains US milk and dairy product prices above those in international markets.  Although 
under current market conditions they have limited impact on the effectiveness of generic 
advertising and are not shown in Figure 1, these policies are also represented in the empirical 
model.   
Supply response is represented through changes in both productivity per unit capital 
(milk production per cow per year in this case) and changes in the capital stock (the number of 
                                                
3 When these purchases of butter, cheese or nonfat dried milk occur, then contribute to government inventory 
holding of these products.  Government inventories are sometimes sold back to commercial firms or are used in 
domestic and international food donation programs. 
March 2007 Nicholson and Kaiser 
 7 
cows).  Productivity changes in response to changes in the price of the raw input (milk) in the 
short run (complete response to a step change in the milk price relative to a reference price 
occurs within about 3 months), whereas the number of cows responds to an exponential smooth 
of relative net margins over three years.  The number of cows is determined by a biological 
reproduction rate (assumed to be constant) and the rate of removal of animals from the 
aggregated national herd, which depends on the average animal lifetime.  The degree to which 
dairy farmers modify average animal lifetimes in response to relative margins is not well known, 
so the impacts of this parameter on simulated outcomes is evaluated with sensitivity analysis.  
Our structure assumes that dairy farmers will continue to expand herd sizes if long-run margins 
are above a constant reference value (albeit with both information and biological delays 
involved) and ignores changes in production costs over the model time horizon.  These 
assumptions differ from many standard models of milk supply response (e.g., Chavas and 
Klemme, 1986) and make overshooting (and oscillatory) behavior in model-predicted milk prices 
more likely. 
The impact of generic advertising on the demand for fluid milk and cheese is modeled 
using a modified multiplicative reference formulation (Sterman, 2000) as follows: 
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This formulation implies that sales of advertised dairy product j at time t are a function of a sales 
in the 2004 reference (base) year, product price Pj relative to reference price, and the maximum 
of the effect of generic advertising expenditures relative to their 2004 reference value or a 
minimum assumed proportion, MPj, of the reference dairy product sales in the absence of generic 
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advertising expenditures4.  The parameters ηj are γj elasticities of sales with respect to price and 
generic advertising expenditures.  Reference sales values are assumed to grow over time at 
proportional monthly growth rates θj.  To reflect delays in the adjustment of sales to changes in 
price and generic advertising expenditures, exponential smoothing with a time constant of one 
month is used. 
The model is formulated using System Dynamics conventions:  it is a system of nonlinear 
differential equations solved by numerical integration.  Model structure, response parameter 
values and initial stock values were developed based on previous dairy industry models (Bishop 
and Nicholson, 2004; Nicholson and Fiddaman, 2003), data from the Agricultural Marketing 
Service of the US Department of Agriculture (which administers the minimum pricing 
regulations), and an extensive network of industry contacts (Cornell Program on Dairy Markets 
and Policy, 2006).  Values of the elasticity of fluid milk and cheese demand with respect to 
advertising expenditures are from Kaiser and Dong (2006), and are equal to 0.037 and 0.035, 
respectively.  Values of the elasticity of fluid milk and cheese demand with respect to price are 
based on Schmit and Kaiser (2004) and Bishop and Nicholson (2004) and are equal to -0.2 and  
-0.5, respectively.  The model simulates all variables at monthly time intervals over the six-year 
period 2004 to 20095.  The model has been evaluated using the process described in Sterman 
(2000) and has previously been used to evaluate the impact of growth in dairy product demand 
on dairy farmer revenues (Nicholson and Stephenson, 2006).  For the purposes of the analyses 
herein, underlying growth in demand for dairy products (i.e., outward shifts in the demand 
curves) in response to increases in household income and population are assumed to be 
exogenous, and are from Nicholson and Stephenson (2006) and Schmit and Kaiser (2006).  
                                                
4 This formulation is necessary to avoid zero sales in the absence of generic advertising. 
5 Note that the time unit of observation is months, but the time unit of calculation (numerical integration) much 
smaller (0.0625 months) to minimize integration error. 
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Although the financial resources used for generic advertising in the dairy industry are derived 
from assessments on dairy farmers and fluid milk processors (and thus depend on milk 
production and sales of fluid milk) the allocation of funds to generic advertising is not 
proportional to funds available, so generic advertising expenditures are assumed to be 
exogenous6.  
Model Scenarios 
We focus on two types of analyses of the dynamic market impacts of generic advertising 
(Table 1).  The first is an analysis of permanent (i.e., “step”) changes in generic advertising in 
the presence of growth in demand for dairy products, and the second is an analysis of which 
proportional allocation of 2004 advertising expenditures between fluid milk and cheese 
maximizes cumulative discounted dairy farmer revenues.  For each of these scenarios, the impact 
of two assumed values of the long-term supply response (sensitivity of average animal lifetime—
which influences cow numbers) to smoothed relative net margins for dairy farmers) is evaluated.  
For the baseline scenarios, the value of the sensitivity of average animal lifetime in response to 
relative net margins is equal to 1.0; for scenarios termed “less sensitive,” the value of this 
parameter is 0.5.  The average animal lifetime uses a multiplicative-reference formulation in 
which the average lifetime is equal to a reference lifetime modified by the ratio of current 
smoothed net margins divided by a reference net margin to the power of the sensitivity parameter 
described above.  Thus, this is equivalent to the economics concept of a constant elasticity 
formulation. 
                                                
6 Funds from dairy farmers are used for a variety of promotional purposes, including product research and 
development and other forms of promotion in addition to advertising.  Funds from fluid milk processors are used to 
promote fluid milk only; dairy farmer funds have been used for a variety of dairy products and dairy ingredients 
(Alan Reed, Dairy Management, Inc., personal communication). 
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Table 1.  Generic Advertising Scenarios Analyzed 
Scenario Implementation 
Baseline Assumed exogenous growth rates for dairy 
products and 2004 level of generic advertising 
expenditure; Allocations between fluid milk and 
cheese as in 2004 
Increase Generic Advertising Increase generic advertising on both fluid milk 
and cheese by 100% from 2004 levels as a 
permanent (step) change beginning in January 
2006 
Eliminate Generic Advertising Eliminate generic advertising on both fluid milk 
and cheese as a permanent (step) change 
beginning in January 2006 
Optimal Product Allocation of 
Generic Advertising 
Determine the optimal allocations of 2004 
generic advertising expenditures between fluid 
milk and cheese as a permanent step change 
beginning in January 2006 
 
Following standard system dynamics convention, the model is initialized in dynamic 
equilibrium (inflows and outflows for all stocks are equal, so that values of endogenous variables 
do not change over time) using the average values of product prices, production and dairy 
product inventories for 2004.  Changes in generic advertising are assumed to be implemented 
fully (i.e., as step changes) in January 2006 and maintained until December 2009. 
Key outcome variables to be assessed are changes in product sales, changes in selected 
dairy product prices, changes in dairy farmer revenues (monthly and cumulative), milk 
production (supply response) and the cumulative benefit-cost ratio (CBCR; the ratio of changes  
in dairy farmer revenues to changes in overall generic advertising expenditures).  The changes in 
cumulative dairy farmer revenues and the CBCR are calculated from January 2006, when 
changes in generic advertising expenditures are assumed to occur.  Because of the nonlinear 
feedback dynamics present in the system, each of these variables is likely to vary over time.  The 
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benefit-cost ratio of generic advertising, previously evaluated only in a static sense, is of 
particular interest. 
Results 
Impacts of Step Increases or Decreases in Generic Advertising Expenditures 
A permanent increase in generic fluid milk and cheese advertising expenditures initially 
increases fluid milk sales during the first two months relative to the 2004 dynamic equilibrium 
baseline which also includes the assumed exogenous growth rates (Figure 2).  As consumers 
respond over time to the associated price increases brought about by increased demand for the 
raw milk to make fluid milk and cheese, there is a relatively small decrease in fluid milk sales 
from their peak value during the next 12 months.  This effect of increasing prices on sales is 
small because fluid milk demand is highly inelastic (0.2 is the elasticity value used in the 
simulations).  About 16 months after the change in generic advertising expenditures fluid 
demand begins to grow again due to decreases in milk price (Figure 3) arising from increased 
milk production (Figure 4).  The value of the sensitivity of the responsiveness of average animal 
lifetime to changes in long-run relative margins has a limited impact on fluid milk sales. 
Permanent elimination of generic advertising expenditures reduces fluid milk sales by a 
larger amount than the permanent increase raises them (Figure 2).  There is an initial rapid 
decrease in fluid milk sales, followed by a brief recovery, then continued decline.  The effect is 
larger than the effect of increased advertising expenditures, indicating an asymmetry in the effect 
of advertising expenditures.  The pattern is the inverse of that observed for expenditure increases, 
and again results from the interaction of dairy product demand, farm milk prices and milk 
production.  The decrease in demand for fluid milk and cheese reduces the demand for raw milk 
from farms, which reduces milk prices and farm margins (Figure 3).  As milk production  
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Figure 2.  Fluid Milk Sales in Response to Increases and Decreases in Generic Advertising 
Expenditures, by Sensitivity of Capital Investment Response 
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Figure 3.  Difference in Producer Milk Price in Response to Increases and Decreases in 
Generic Advertising Expenditures, by Sensitivity of Capital Investment Response 
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Figure 4. Milk Production in Response to 
Increases and Decreases in Generic Advertising Expenditures, by Sensitivity of Capital 
Investment Response 
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capacity responds over time, milk production decreases relative to what it would have been, and 
milk prices increase compared to what they would have been (Figure 3).  An important 
conclusion to be drawn from these results is that milk prices will not always be higher for the 
scenario with increased generic advertising, nor lower for the scenario with elimination of 
generic advertising (Figure 3).  As milk production responds over time to initial price increases 
or decreases through the supply response feedback loop, about 30 months after the increase or 
decrease farmer milk prices become higher (for the decrease) or lower (for the increase) than 
they would have been in the absence of any change in generic advertising expenditures. 
The patterns of changes in cheese sales in response to generic advertising changes are 
qualitatively similar to those for fluid milk (Figure 5).  However, cheese sales increase more 
rapidly and continuously in the case of increased generic advertising expenditures because the 
assumed underlying rate of growth in cheese demand is about 1% per year, whereas it is 0% for 
fluid milk.  Cheese sales also decrease more rapidly and continuously in response to a decrease 
in advertising expenditures.  These patterns are responses to the changes in cheese prices that 
occur in response to changes in generic advertising expenditures (Figure 6).  In response to the 
increase in sales due to increased advertising, cheese prices initially increase by about 7 cents per 
pound during the first six months.  After that, as consumers decrease cheese purchases in 
response to increased cheese prices and dairy farmers increase milk production, commercial 
inventories of cheese accumulate and the price decreases.  By about two years after the increase 
in advertising expenditures, the cheese price becomes lower than it would have been in the 
absence of an increase in advertising.   
Conversely, the elimination of all generic advertising initially results in a reduction in 
cheese prices of more than 10 cents per pound over the first six months, but by two years after  
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Figure 5.  Cheese Sales in Response to Increases and Decreases in Generic Advertising 
Expenditures, by Sensitivity of Capital Investment Response 
Cheese Price
170
165
160
155
150
145
140
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48 52 56 60 64 68 72
Time (Month)
Cheese Price[AmCheese] : Decrease Ad Exp 100 Less Sensitive $/cwt
Cheese Price[AmCheese] : Decrease Ad Exp 100 $/cwt
Cheese Price[AmCheese] : Baseline $/cwt
Cheese Price[AmCheese] : Dyn Eq $/cwt  
 
Figure 6.  Cheese Prices in Response to Increases and Decreases in Generic Advertising 
Expenditures, by Sensitivity of Capital Investment Response 
 
the change in advertising, cheese prices are higher than they would have been in the absence of 
the advertising change (Figure 6).  Again, there is an asymmetric response to equivalent dollar-
value changes in generic advertising expenditures.  One additional difference is that the value of 
the sensitivity of producer adjustments in average animal lifetime results in more marked 
differences in cheese prices.  When dairy farmers adjust more quickly, cheese prices rise more 
quickly over time, resulting in a 3 cent difference per pound by the end of model simulation. 
As noted above, changes in generic advertising expenditures influence the price of cheese 
and the milk price received by farmers.  This effect is mediated by the regulated price feedback 
loop, which increases the minimum regulated price as cheese prices increase, or decrease the 
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Figure 7. Butter Prices in Response to Increases and Decreases in Generic Advertising 
Expenditures, by Sensitivity of Capital Investment Response 
 
minimum price as cheese prices decrease (all else equal).  However, because there are multiple 
products made from the components in milk, prices of dairy products other than fluid milk and  
cheese will be influenced by changes in generic advertising expenditures.  A good example is 
butter (Figure 7).  Growth in demand for products assumed in the baseline is simulated to reduce 
the butter price over time.  This occurs because the demand for dairy products made from milk 
components other than fat is increasing more quickly than those made with higher fat contents. 
The impact of an increase in generic advertising expenditures is initially to increase the 
butter price from what it would have been, but after about 18 months butter prices are lower 
because milk production (and therefore butterfat) has increased and the demand for butterfat has 
not increased as quickly.  Because butter is another product used in the minimum price 
regulation formulae, this decrease in the butter price offsets to a certain extent the impacts of 
generic advertising.  When generic advertising expenditures are eliminated, an initial decrease in 
the butter price occurs.  When producers are less responsive (modify average animal lifetime less 
in response to margin changes), butter prices remain low because milk production does not 
decrease as rapidly.  When producers modify average animal lifetimes relatively quickly, there is 
a large and rapid increase in the butter price beginning one year after the elimination of generic 
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advertising, and what appears to be the beginning of relatively large-amplitude fluctuations in 
butter price.  Nicholson and Fiddaman (2004) and other dairy industry analysts have recognized 
for some time that butter prices tend to be more volatile in recent years than other dairy product 
prices, and our analysis suggests that changes in generic advertising expenditures—when dairy 
farmers are relative more responsive—may enhance the amplitude of butter price fluctuations. 
One principal objective of generic advertising for fluid milk and cheese is to increase 
revenues received by US dairy farmers.  Our analyses suggest that even when various balancing 
feedback loops are taken into account, expenditures on generic advertising return far more 
revenue to dairy farmers than the expenditures.  An permanent doubling of generic advertising 
expenditures would increase cumulative dairy farmer revenues by about $3 billion, but would 
cost only about $485 million over the four years from 2006 to 2009 (Figure 8).  Elimination of 
generic advertising expenditures would reduce dairy farmer revenues between $5.3 and $7.5 
billion over those four years, when the sensitivity of milk production to changes in long run 
margin is higher and lower, respectively.   
The cumulative benefit-cost ratio (CBCR) at time t can be computed during the period 
2006 to 2009 as: 
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where Revenuest are the cumulative dairy farmer revenues at time t for scenarios S and B (the 
baseline) and GAEt are generic advertising expenditures for the same scenario. The CBCR varies 
over time depending on developments in dairy product markets (Figure 9).  However, for both 
increases and decreases in generic advertising expenditures the CBCR grows rapidly then 
decreases.  For a doubling of generic advertising expenditures, the CBCR increases to about 8.5 
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Figure 8.  Difference in Cumulative Producer Revenues in Response to Increases and 
Decreases in Generic Advertising Expenditures, by Sensitivity of Capital Investment 
Response 
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Figure 9. Dynamic Cumulative Benefit Cost Ratio for Increases and Decreases in Generic 
Advertising Expenditures, by Sensitivity of Capital Investment Response 
Difference in Cumulative Producer Revenues
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and then decreases to a value just above 6.  These estimates are higher than past benefit-cost 
ratios estimated for generic dairy advertising (e.g., 5.40 for the period 1975 to 1993 by Kaiser 
(1995).  However, this is likely due to the fact that most previous estimates are net benefit-cost 
ratios, where our estimates are based on gross dairy farm revenue and therefore should be higher.  
The sensitivity of dairy farmers to average animal lifetime has little impact on the CBCR for 
generic advertising expenditure increases.  If generic advertising were eliminated, the value of 
the CBCR is larger (after the initial increase, it is greater than 11.0) and the ratio is larger when 
dairy farmers are less sensitive (Figure 9).  The differences in the values of these dynamically-
calculated CBCR are also indicative of asymmetric responses to increases and decreases in 
generic advertising expenditures.  
Overall, the scenarios indicate that on average over the period 2006 to 2009, increased 
generic advertising expenditures on fluid milk and cheese would increase fluid milk and cheese 
sales, increase milk production, increase cumulative dairy farmer revenues, and have a CBCR far 
larger than 1.0 (Table 2).  Conversely, elimination of the generic advertising expenditures would 
decrease fluid milk and cheese sales, decrease milk production, and decrease cumulative dairy 
farmer revenues.  Moreover, the CBCR of generic advertising expenditures appear to be larger at 
smaller expenditures levels, as indicated by the asymmetries in response in doubling and 
elimination.  Thus, our analyses support the effectiveness of generic advertising to enhance dairy 
farmer well-being, even in the face of multiple feedback loops and product market effects. 
Allocation of Existing Expenditures to Maximize Cumulative Dairy Farmer Revenues 
Although the overall effectiveness of generic advertising expenditures is addressed in our 
previous analyses, another relevant question is whether those expenditures are being allocated in 
a manner that maximizes their effectiveness, that is, that generates the largest cumulative dairy 
March 2007 Nicholson and Kaiser 
 19 
 
Table 2.  Summary of Simulation Scenario Results 
Scenario 
Cumulative 
Advertising 
Expenditures 
($ mil) 
Average 
Fluid Milk 
Sales  
(mil 
lbs/mo)  
Average 
Cheese 
Sales 
(mil 
lbs/mo) 
Average 
Milk 
Production 
(bil 
lbs/mo) 
Cumulative 
Producer 
Revenues 
($ bil) 
Cumulative 
Benefit 
Cost Ratio1 
Baseline (with demand growth) 495.3 4774.5 317.1 14.7 117.3 -- 
Change from Baseline       
Increase Generic Advertising       
Base supply response +495.3 +110.2 +4.9 +0.2 +3.0 6.2 
Less sensitive supply response +495.3 +110.3 +4.8 +0.2 +3.1 6.4 
Eliminate Generic Advertising       
Base supply response -495.3 -216.9 -10.5 -0.4 -5.3 10.9 
Less sensitive supply response -495.3 -213.2 -9.7 -0.2 -7.5 15.4 
Optimal Product Allocation of 
Generic Advertising       
Base supply response 0.02 -68.0 +7.0 0.1 +2.0 --3 
Less sensitive supply response 0.02 -65.3 +7.2 0.1 +1.5 --3 
1 The cumulative benefit cost ratio is defined as the change in cumulative producer revenues (from the 
baseline) divided by the change in cumulative advertising expenditures (from the baseline) at the end of 
model simulation time.  It is calculated for the reported scenarios, not as a change from the baseline 
scenario. 
2 There is no overall change in aggregate generic advertising expenditures.  However, $2.3 million of the 
funds provided by dairy farmers is switched from fluid milk to cheese advertising expenditures. 
3 Not reported because there is no change in cumulative advertising expenditures, only a reallocation 
among the two advertised products. 
 
farmer revenues.  Because the component contents of fluid milk and cheese differ (the proportion 
of other solids to fat is higher in fluid milk), because their estimated demand elasticities differ 
and because they have different impacts on the minimum regulated price formulae, it is possible 
that re-allocation of generic advertising expenditures may modify dairy farmer revenues.To 
explore this hypothesis, and to determine what allocation between fluid milk and cheese would 
maximize cumulative dairy farmer revenues, the Powell optimization algorithm in Vensim® 
dynamic simulation software (Ventana Systems, 2002) was used to examine what step change in 
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fluid milk advertising expenditures from funds provided by dairy farmers would maximize 
cumulative revenues for dairy farmers.  Because fluid milk processors allocate checkoff funds 
only to generic advertising of fluid milk, generic advertising expenditures by fluid milk 
processors was assumed to be constant.  A corresponding change in generic advertising 
expenditures for cheese by dairy farmers was made to keep overall expenditures on generic 
advertising expenditures constant.  The optimization assumed a permanent, simultaneous step 
change in allocation of generic advertising expenditures starting in January 20067.   
The optimization results suggest that dairy farmer revenues could be increased through a 
complete reallocation of fluid milk advertising expenditures to cheese expenditures for funds 
provided by dairy farmers (Table 2).  A reduction of 100% in fluid milk advertising expenditures 
by dairy farmers in expenditures on fluid milk (from about $2.3 million per month) and an 
increase of 141% in cheese expenditures (from $1.7 million per month to $4.1 million per 
month) maximizes dairy farmer revenues.  It is important to note that under this optimal solution, 
there still is significant generic fluid milk advertising, but it is being financed entirely by fluid 
milk processors.  The optimal allocation of advertising expenditures to the two products was not 
at all sensitive to the responsiveness of average animal lifetime.  The dynamic patterns of 
behavior observed as a result of the optimal reallocation of expenditures results in a reduction in 
fluid milk sales and increase in cheese sales, with behaviors similar to those observed for these 
products in response to a decrease and increase in advertising expenditures, respectively (Figure 
10).  Producer prices first increase, then decrease, then increase again in response the 
reallocation, more so in the final months of the simulation than as a part of the initial response.  
Our results indicate that increases in cumulative dairy farmer revenues can be achieved through 
                                                
7 Note that this is distinct from an optimization approach to determine the optimal allocation of advertising 
expenditures across products and over time.  This may be the subject of future work with the current modeling 
framework. 
March 2007 Nicholson and Kaiser 
 21 
Cheese Demand
3.5 M
3.375 M
3.25 M
3.125 M
3 M
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48 52 56 60 64 68 72
Time (Month)
Domestic Cheese Demand[AmCheese] : Optimize Sens=0pt5 cwt/Month
Domestic Cheese Demand[AmCheese] : Optimize Sens=1 cwt/Month
Domestic Cheese Demand[AmCheese] : Baseline cwt/Month
Domestic Cheese Demand[AmCheese] : Dyn Eq cwt/Month  
Cumulative Producer Revenue Difference
6,000
4,000
2,000
0
-2,000
-4,000
-6,000
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48 52 56 60 64 68 72
Time (Month)
Difference in Cumulative Producer Revenues : Optimize Sens=0pt5 mil $
Difference in Cumulative Producer Revenues : Optimize Sens=1 mil $
Difference in Cumulative Producer Revenues : Baseline mil $
Difference in Cumulative Producer Revenues : Dyn Eq mil $  
Figure 10. Selected Impacts of Changes to Allocation of Generic Advertising Expenditures 
by Dairy Farmers between Fluid Milk and Cheese to Maximize Discounted Producer 
Revenues 
reallocation of existing expenditures that are one-half to two-thirds as large as those achieve 
through a doubling of expenditures but with the current product allocation, depending on dairy 
farmer responsiveness to average animal lifetime (Table 2).  
Conclusions and Implications 
Although there have been numerous econometric evaluations of generic dairy 
advertising, this is the first study that has applied System Dynamics to this type of research.  The 
use of SD in generic dairy advertising evaluation is a contribution because it provides for a more 
complete model of the complexities of milk characteristics and economic regulations of the U.S. 
dairy industry.  In particular, our SD model more realistically links milk supply response, dairy 
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economic regulations, and pricing of all milk components than previous models, and thereby 
adds a more comprehensive analysis of generic advertising impacts on the industry. 
Our analysis reaffirms the findings of other authors that generic dairy advertising is a 
highly profitable activity on the part of dairy farmers and milk processors.  Indeed, the estimated 
cumulative benefit-cost ratios from this analysis are higher than previous estimates, but this is 
due to our estimates being gross measures while previous estimates have been net measures.  
Furthermore, unlike previous research, the results of this model provide detailed time paths of 
the response of important endogenous variables to changes in generic fluid milk and cheese 
advertising.  One of the more interesting findings is the interaction between changes in demand 
caused by advertising, milk supply response, and prices.  Specifically, we find that in the very 
short run, changes in advertising are positively associated with changes in prices.  However, over 
time, milk production responses significantly erode the price impacts of advertising.  This effect 
results in part from our assumptions about factors driving milk production response, suggesting 
that further research on micro-level production responses would be beneficial.  The optimal 
product allocation of generic advertising was also investigated.  The results indicate that fluid 
milk advertising should be reduced, and cheese advertising increased in order to maximize dairy 
farmer revenue. 
One aim of this paper was to illustrate the usefulness of SD in advertising evaluation.  
There are many useful research extensions that could be made with this model, and we briefly 
discuss three of them here.  One useful extension would be to use the current model to evaluate 
the optimality of other program activities such as other promotion programs, public relations, 
sponsorship, and new product research.  Since more money is being invested by dairy farmers in 
alternative activities, an optimal portfolio analysis of this sort would be of tremendous interest to 
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policy makers.  Second, the optimal allocation of both advertising expenditures and other 
promotional activities over time could be analyzed, and could improve cumulative dairy farmer 
revenues through reduction of the effects of the supply response feedback loop (which results in 
increased milk supplies).  Finally, milk prices and supply response  differ on a regional basis.  
Thus, a more significant extension of our work would be to develop a multi-regional model that 
explicitly incorporates the regional pricing structure and supply response differences.  Such an 
extension would also allow evaluating optimal advertising spending over geographic markets. 
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